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Question 
What has been the pattern of political party development in Ukraine over the last 10 years 
and how have these parties performed in recent elections?  
Contents 
1. Overview 
2. The pattern of party development in Ukraine 
3. The main parties and their electoral performance, 2004-2013 
4. Leading competitors in the 2014 parliamentary elections 
5. References 
1. Overview 
Political parties in Ukraine were first formed only in 1990, initially as formations based largely on former 
dissident groups with national-democratic orientation and the tendency to frequently split into separate 
parties. By the mid-1990s various regional financial industrial groups became involved in forming centrist 
parties to further their interests. All parties in Ukraine remain highly underdeveloped. Despite some 
seeming stabilisation of the main parties after the ‘orange revolution’ of 2004, the ‘Euromaidan revolution’ 
of 2013-14 and the departure of President Yanukovych from the political scene has prompted a 
thoroughgoing restructuring of the party space. The main competitors in the pre-term parliamentary 
elections due to take place in October 2014 now include a large number of new configurations and 
recently-formed electoral alliances. Nevertheless, despite the presence of new faces on parties’ electoral 
lists, the key players remain established politicians who are attempting to prove their ‘revitalisation’ by 
including Euromaidan civil society activists and officers from the Donbas conflict.  
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Key political developments include: 
 Ukraine’s 7th parliamentary elections will take place according to a mixed electoral system where 
225, or 50 per cent of seats, will be elected by a proportional party list system using closed party 
lists and allocating seats to parties obtaining over 5 per cent of the vote. The remaining seats will 
be elected via a single member district plurality (first past the post) system.1 This electoral system 
was in operation during the 2012 elections, but remained contested by political elites vying for an 
advantage in the electoral rules. For each of the preceding elections, the electoral law was subject 
to considerable changes in terms of the electoral system (from full majoritarian [1994] to mixed 
[1998, 2002] to full proportional [2006, 2007] to mixed [2012, 2014] again) and key features 
(threshold, registration rules etc.). The conduct of elections at national and local level under 
President Yanukovych deteriorated markedly and the ‘party of power’, the Party of Regions – 
Ukraine’s only political machine – benefitted from extensive access to state administrative 
resources in Russophone eastern and southern Ukraine.  
 The institutional environment for conducting elections has changed substantially since the 
previous parliamentary elections held in 2012. On 21st February 2014, at the same time as 
impeaching President Yanukovych, the parliament (Verkhovna Rada) voted to reinstate the 2004 
version of the Constitution (used in 2006-2010) that reduces the role of the president in the 
formation of the executive, and foresees formation of the government by a parliamentary coalition 
of parties.   
 The 2004 constitutional reform formally significantly enhanced the role of parties in Ukraine’s 
political system. However, in conditions of a weakly institutionalised party system (Rybyi 2013; 
Razumkov 2010), the reform tended to aggravate existing problems such as domination by 
Financial Industrial Groups (FIGs), excessive personalisation of parties, weakness of grassroots 
organisations, limited ideological or programmatic coherence and regionalised basis of electoral 
support.   
 In 2010, President Yanukovych pressured the Constitutional Court to restore the 1996 version of 
the Constitution. This endowed the president with significant formal powers over the executive. 
The 1996 constitution provided few institutional incentives for politicians to invest in party 
building. Another dubious Constitutional Court ruling permitted individual MPs to defect to join 
coalitions, increasing political corruption to very high levels as opposition MPs were bribed to 
move to the governing coalition. Parliament was characterised by high levels of party defections 
and comparatively low voting discipline during 1996-2006 (Whitmore, 2004) and in 2010-2014.  
 Party loyalties even among party leaders remain extremely weak and fluid in Ukraine and party 
leaders utilise non-transparent, populist and sometimes corrupt (e.g. selling places on the list to 
business people) criteria in forming party lists. In 2014, the result is rather eclectic collections of 
politicians under the main party brands, including Bloc of Petro Poroshenko, Batkivshchina, 
Popular Front, Civic Position, the Radical Party and Strong Ukraine.  
 The weakness of ideology and huge political corruption has meant that leading Ukrainian 
politicians have been chameleons. Poroshenko was one of five party leaders who established the 
Party of Regions, then moved to Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine, Yatseniuk’s Front for Change 
                                                             
1 According to the constitution, Ukraine’s parliament has 450 seats. However due to the annexation of Crimea 
by the Russian Federation, it is not possible to conduct elections to the 12 Crimean constituencies. Furthermore, 
the ongoing conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions means that it will not be possible to hold elections in 
an estimated 9-18 of the 32 constituencies in those regions (OPORA 2014).  
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and Klitschko’s UDAR (Ukrainian Alliance for Democratic Reforms). In the course of this political 
career he has launched three virtual parties with ‘Solidarity’ in the title. Yatseniuk was an ally of 
Tihipko, then of Yushchenko, launched Front for Change, turned against Tymoshenko, offered 
Yanukovych his availability for the position of prime minister, merged Front for Change with 
Batkivshchina and became its leader when Tymoshenko was in prison and after she was released 
defected to re-reform his own political vehicle.  
2. The pattern of party development in Ukraine 
Scholarly studies consistently point to the structural and ideological weaknesses of political parties in 
Ukraine and the lack of institutionalisation of the party system (inter alia Haran and Zimmer 2008; Kuzio 
2014; Rybyi 2013). Although Ukraine can boast an incredibly large number of legally registered parties (225 
in September 2014, with 27 new parties registered in 2014 alone (State Registration Service of Ukraine, 
http://www.drsu.gov.ua/party)), a large proportion do not participate in elections.   This proliferation 
attests to the extreme personalisation of the party system and the shallowness of grassroots organisation, 
which help to account for high turnover of parties and especially MPs, between elections. Applying 
Western definitions of the functions of political parties, few, if any, parties in Ukraine can claim to 
aggregate interests, reflect societal cleavages, offer alternative governments or act as a linkage mechanism 
between state and society.  
 
Research tends to point to a combination of institutional and structural factors to account for party 
development in Ukraine, although there is no clear consensus on the relative ordering of the various factors 
such that party weakness seems over-determined. Kuzio (2014) emphasises predominantly cultural and 
societal factors such as Soviet political culture, corruption, elites’ provinciality and regional/linguistic 
diversity. The weakness of ideology in political parties is commonplace throughout post-Soviet Eurasia, 
not just in Ukraine, making the region different to post-communist Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. 
Rybiy (2013) focuses on the poor incentives for party institutionalisation due to the design and instability 
of the institutional rules of the game (overall the constitution and law on elections) and electoral volatility. 
In additional to institutional factors such as the lack of incentives for party building in presidential political 
systems, Bader (2010) draws attention to the extensive use of state administrative resources by regime-
supported parties (such as the Party of Regions in the Ukrainian case) and the dominance of party leaders 
at the expense of internal party democracy. In addition, the vast influence of various FIGs on parties’ 
formation, operation, decision-making, legislative activity and voting records in parliament increased 
during 2004-2014 (Matuszak 2012, p.14-16; Razumkov 2010) and so far there is little evidence to suggest 
that the Euromaidan revolution has substantially changed this.  
Influence of Financial Industrial Groups (FIGs) 
In Ukraine big business and politics remain closely fused, because (as in other post-Soviet countries) in the 
absence of a functioning rule of law, one of the best ways to protect and advance one’s business interests 
is by entering politics, either directly, or via proxies embedded in (sometimes several) political parties. 
Being on good terms with the president is both vital for the success of big business and good for access to 
insider privatisation and preferential treatment over the allocation of government contracts. This has been 
evident in 2010-2014 with the growth of the business empires of Rinat Akhmetov, Dmytro Firtash and 
President Yanukovych’s ‘Family’ clan. This tendency became more pronounced after the 2004 
constitutional change came into force (in 2006), which increased the role of political parties in government 
formation and survival. It was also due to the desire of various FIGs to protect their businesses from the 
threat of ‘reprivatisation’ immediately after the ‘orange revolution’, during Tymoshenko’s premiership in 
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2005.  The absence of alternative sources of funding and high costs of media and campaigning also 
reinforce party’s dependence on FIGs.  
 
FIGs influence on parties engendered the widespread use of negative campaigning, election fraud and 
blackmail dubbed ‘political technology’ (Wilson 2005), with oligarchic takeovers of existing party brands 
(Haran and Zimmer 2008), the creation of project parties (that aimed to win seats for a particular FIG or 
FIGs) and spoiler parties (created to take votes from the competition). Such influence also contributed to 
extremely opaque party funding (Rybyi 2013, p.418-9) and inflated or bogus membership claims (Razumkov 
2010).  
 
The main FIGs in Ukraine were/are: 
 Akhmetov group (Donetsk) – Ukraine’s richest man, Rinat Akhmetov and key associates such as 
Borys Kolesnikov, were key financiers of the Party of Regions (PRU) since its inception in 2000-
2001 (Kudelia and Kuzio, 2014) and PRU’s parliamentary faction contained approximately 50 MPs 
considered to be Akhmetov’s people. Akhmetov however is also alleged to have ‘spread bet’ by 
financing other political parties including, allegedly, Yatseniuk’s ‘Front for Change’ party in 2011-
12 and virtual election spoilers such as Forward Ukraine! (formerly the Social Democratic Party of 
Ukraine) in 2012.  
 The ‘gas lobby’ – linked to opaque gas trading intermediaries Eural-Tran-Gas (ETG), RosUkrEnergo 
(RUE) and OstChem, operated as a pro-Russian lobby or even as a proxy for (unspecified) Russian 
interests in Ukraine, such as a Russian controlled consortium over Ukraine’s gas pipelines. Key 
figures include former head of Yanukovych’s administration Serhiy Lyovochkhin who is standing in 
the 2014 elections, RUE shareholder Dmytro Firtash who is on bail in Vienna awaiting deportation 
to the US to stand trial on corruption charges, and former Deputy PM Yuriy Boyko who is heading 
the Opposition Bloc in the 2014 elections. This group has always successfully established good 
relations with each of Ukraine’s five presidents and had close contacts with Yushchenko during his 
presidency and established a centre of influence within the Party of Regions. During Yanukovych’s 
presidency the gas lobby received the positions of Chief of Staff (Lyovochkin), Minister of Energy 
(Boyko) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (Kostyantyn Hryshchenko). The gas lobby was in conflict 
with Yulia Tymoshenko (PM in 2005, 2007-2010 and co-leader of the orange revolution) and 
consistently supported opposition alternatives to Tymoshenko, whether Yatseniuk (2010), 
Klitschko (2012), Poroshenko 2014) and Liashko’s Radical Party (2012, 2014). Poroshenko and 
Klitschko visited Firtash in Vienna in March where he persuaded the latter to drop his candidacy 
in favour of the former.  
 The ‘Family’ – a group of businessmen close to Viktor Yanukovych, headed by his eldest son 
Oleksandr, a dentist by profession whose business empire massively expanded in 2010-2014. ‘The 
Family’ was an attempt by Yanukovych to create his personal clan independent of his older 
Donetsk allies and the gas lobby. Its members fled to Russia with Yanukovych and they are not 
reported to be funding political parties.  
 Privat group (Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Hennadiy Boholyubov) – this group has tended to pursue a 
very pragmatic approach to political involvement, depending on who is in power, although they 
have tended to side with democratic and nationalist forces. During the last decade Kolomoyskyi 
backed both Our Ukraine (Yushchenko) and Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchina when opportune 
(Matsuszak 2012, p.28), and sought some accommodation with Yanukovych. During 2014 
Kolomoyskyi enjoyed good relations with Petro Poroshenko, and was appointed governor of 
Dnipropetrovsk region. Kolomoyskyi’s media holdings were involved in negative campaigning 
against Radical Party leader Liashko (http://tabloid.pravda.com.ua/focus/54212dea5e81c/).    
 Many minor oligarchs – were also involved in funding/controlling political parties. These included 
Petro Poroshenko (Solidarity party 1 was a founding party of PRU, Solidarity party 2 merged with 
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Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine and Solidarity party 3 is a member of the Poroshenko bloc) and Serhiy 
Tihipko (Labour Ukraine and Strong Ukraine, which merged with the Party of Regions in 2012 but 
‘seceded’ from it after the Euromaidan).  
 
Regional nature of parties 
Regional differentiation is considered in the literature and by experts as significantly more important in 
explaining patterns of party support than rural/urban distinctions.2 Regional differentiation of party 
support and the limited ability of any party to establish a truly national electorate has been a persistent 
feature of Ukrainian parliamentary elections (Haran and Zimmer, 2008, p.547). Regional identities were 
mobilised by parties during election campaigns in the absence of coherent ideological or programmatic 
party differentiation. Parties thus have sought to tap into thorny questions around language use, attitudes 
to foreign policy and assessments of historic figures and events where there exists significant variation in 
attitudes to these issues as one travels from western to eastern Ukraine (Razumkov, 2010, p.17; 
Melnykovska et al., 2011).  
 
It has been argued that if before 2004 socio-cultural factors were one of the factors structuring the party 
system, after 2004 they became decisive because of the extensive use of ‘political technology’ during the 
2004 presidential election campaign that brought Ukraine close to interregional conflict (Razumkov, 2010, 
p.17). The Kuchma and Putin regimes’ backing of Yanukovych’s candidacy involved ‘black PR’ to paint 
Yushchenko as an agent of the USA, as an anti-Semite and as a western Ukrainian fascist (Wilson, 2005a, 
pp.94-6) – all themes that were made more prominent under Yanukovych and especially during and since 
the Euromaidan. After 2004, parties tasks of mobilising the electorate was simplified by manipulating public 
consciousness over identity issues, which served to distract voters from socio-economic problems 
(Razumkov, 2010, p.18, 25). Such contentious issues were especially successful in mobilising voters in the 
two heartlands of the Party of Regions and CPU – Donbas and Crimea – and produced anger and hostility 
against the ‘fascist’ Euromaidan that was viewed as illegitimate and put into power by a ‘Western coup.’ 
The Party of Regions and CPU monopolised power in Russophone eastern and southern Ukraine and their 
marginalisation has opened up a political vacuum in this region. The party is in the process of disintegration 
following Yanukovych’s flight and with 2-3 per cent support in the polls, is not standing in the 2014 
elections. Polls also show its ally, the Communist Party (CPU) that could be banned over allegations of 
supporting separatists, unlikely to cross the threshold.  
Personalisation and weakness of grassroots organisation 
Political parties remain heavily dependent upon the presence of a charismatic leader to win votes, and the 
most successful parties/coalitions of the last decade have been excessively personalised. Put simply there 
would be no Batkivshchina, Our Ukraine and UDAR without Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and Klitchko. 
Personalised parties such as Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchina consequently 
were prone to splits and defections, particularly when out of power. Recent research has demonstrated 
that the Party of Regions was much more organisationally coherent due to more consensual decision 
making borne of the need to balance the interests of various FIGs (Kudelia and Kuzio, 2014). Parties 
therefore often function as the personal ‘project’ of a particular individual, and even the core ‘team’ can 
be quite fluid and change affiliation between elections.   
                                                             
2 Information and data on urban/rural voting patterns is not readily available. 
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Limited ideological or programmatic coherence 
Ukrainian voters have little idea about the ideological or programmatic orientation of the parties they 
vote for, instead tending to be guided by the ‘personal factor’ of the leader, which is not surprising given 
the amorphous positioning of parties (Rybyi 2013, pp.415-6) and frequent changes in stated policy 
preferences of leaders (Kuzio 2014, p.4). Given the dramatic restructuring of the party space during 2014, 
it is likely to be even harder for voters to identify the orientation of parties and voters will divide into 
moderates backing Poroshenko-Klitschko (Poroshenko bloc) and Tihipko (Strong Ukraine) and radicals 
more willing to play with nationalism backing Tymoshenko (Batkivshchina) and Yatseniuk (Popular Front) 
or those seeking to protest vote backing Liashko (Radical Party) 
3. The main parties and their electoral performance, 2004-13  
Table 1 shows the main political parties in Ukraine and their electoral performance in the last four 
parliamentary elections, during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010) and Viktor Yanukovych 
(2010-2014). The main parliamentary parties were the Party of Regions (PRU), the Bloc of Yulia 
Tymoshenko (reformed as political party Batkivshchina which merged with Arseniy Yatseniuk’s Front for 
Change in 2011 as a result of the new electoral law which banned the participation of blocs) and President 
Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc, which disintegrated towards the end of his presidency (in 2010), with 
some politicians and component parties joining Tymoshenko’s bloc (BYuT).  
 
Table 1: Electoral performance of key parties shown as percentage of votes  
Party Leader 2002* 2006 2007 2012* 
Party of Regions 
(PRU) 
Mykola Azarov, 
Viktor Yanukovych 
11.2 as part 
of For a 
United 
Ukraine bloc  
32.1 34.4 30.0 
Bloc of Yulia 
Tymoshenko 
(BYuT) 
(Batkivshchina in 
2012) 
Yulia Tymoshenko 
(1999-2011 and since 
2014)/Arseniy 
Yatseniuk in 2012-14 
7.5 22.3 30.7 25.6 
UDAR  Vitaly Klychko - - - 14.0 
Communist Party Petro Symonenko 20.8 3.7 5.4 13.2 
Freedom 
(Svoboda)  
Oleh Tyanhybok -  0.8 9.7 
Our Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko 
(2002-04 and since 
2010, Yu. Lutsenko 
(2005-10), Valentyn 
Nalyvaychenko 
(2009-11) 
24.5 14.0 14.2 1.1 
Agrarian Party (to 
2004)/People’s 
Party (2005-
2006)/Lytvyn Bloc 
(in 2007) 
Volodymyr Lytvyn 
(with Tihypko’s 
Strong Ukraine in 
2007) 
- 2.4 4.0 1.1 
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Radical Party Oleh Liashko - - - 1.1 
Socialist Party Olekandr Moroz, 
Mykola Rudkovskyi 
7.1 5.7 2.9 2.4 
For a United 
Ukraine bloc (incl. 
Party of Regions) 
Volodymyr Lytvyn 12.2 - - - 
Social Democratic 
Party of Ukraine-
United 
Viktor Medvedchuk 6.5 1.1 (as part 
of bloc ‘Ne 
Tak’ [Not 
Like This]) 
- - 
*Election held under a mixed PR/majoritarian system. Table shows the result in the proportional vote only. 
Source: www.cvk.gov.ua 
 
Note: A large number of unaffiliated MPs were present in the parliament, as parties and blocs included 
many notables and entrepreneurs who were not party members in their party lists, and in 2002 and 2012 
elections, ‘independents’ also competed alongside party candidates in single member districts.  
 
The Party of Regions was the main opposition party under Yushchenko and was able to preserve its 
integrity by offering protection to the business interests it housed (Kudelia and Kuzio, 2014). The period 
was marked by bitter political battles between the three groupings, with two allied against the third at 
different points. For instance, the parliamentary coalition supporting Tymoshenko’s government, 
comprising Our Ukraine, BYuT and the Socialist Party, struggled to support the government’s bills due to, 
inter alia, bitter infighting between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. Following the 2006 elections, the 
parties were unable to form a working coalition for six months, before finally a deal was struck between 
Yushchenko where PRU’s Yanukovych became PM backed by the PRU, Communists and Socialists, with 
Our Ukraine briefly maintaining some governmental positions. This was an unstable situation, leading to 
early elections in 2007 after which Yulia Tymoshenko returned as PM. However, the ‘orange’ coalition of 
227 (only 2 more than the minimum) never gave her support as within Our Ukraine there was a large anti-
Tymoshenko faction which supported a grand coalition with the Party of Regions. Yushchenko and 
Tymoshenko at different times sought to negotiate grand coalitions, the former in 2006-2007 and the latter 
in 2008-2009, with the Party of Regions. 
 
After Yanukovych’s election as president in 2010, he moved swiftly to restructure the parliamentary 
coalition and remove Tymoshenko as PM. MPs from her coalition were persuaded (including by extensive 
use of bribery) to join a new coalition based on the Party of Regions and Communists, buttressed by a 
number of ‘independent’ deputies, many of whom were defectors from Our Ukraine and BYuT. This 
coalition remained intact until February 2014, when the use of snipers to murder over 100 unarmed 
protesters in the centre of Kyiv prompted an exodus of 30-50 MPs and the Party of Regions denunciation 
of Yanukovych. After Yanukovych fled from Kyiv, his impeachment and the later appointment of Yatseniuk 
as PM by over 300 votes signalled a restructuring of parliamentary groupings. The new government was 
supported by a coalition of Batkivshchina, UDAR, Svoboda and new groups ‘Economic Development’ and 
‘Sovereign European Ukraine’ (both moderate defectors from the Party of Regions), but this coalition 
struggled to support key government bills and early elections were sought by President Poroshenko to 
renew the legitimacy of a parliament tarnished by its role in passing a legislative basis for dictatorship on 
16 January 2014. The Communist Party was banned from forming a parliamentary faction after its 
membership dropped below the minimum requirement and as a result of court proceedings to ban the 
party for its support of separatism. The Party of Regions shrank to 77 MPs, as others left or joined new 
factions, some supporting the new president and government.  
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4. Leading competitors in the 2014 parliamentary elections 
29 parties are registered to participate in the 2014 elections in the party list part of the vote, but a majority 
of these are polling less than 1 per cent. Table 2 shows those competitors polling over 1 per cent in recent 
polls in comparison to their performance in the 2012 elections and indicates significant turbulence in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the Yanukovych regime and of the Party of Regions. The newly formed 
electoral bloc supporting Petro Poroshenko is likely to receive a plurality of votes, while the Party of 
Regions, which won a plurality in the previous three elections, withdrew from competing. The poll data 
does not take into account the recent formation of the ‘Opposition Bloc’, which brings together figures 
from the previous regime and led by Yuriy Boyko.  
 
The election is likely to see 5-7 parties pass the 5 per cent threshold, with other supporters elected in single 
mandate constituencies. The new Rada will be more radical on reform and nationalistic than its 
predecessor, as the main parties have sought to show their patriotism by including prominent civic 
activists, anti-corruption journalists and also military officers into their party lists, but there will be plenty 
of faces familiar to parliament with both political and business backgrounds.  
  
The text below the table offers some orientation on individual party/bloc’s positioning, electoral basis (on 
the basis of Kyiv International Institute of Sociology poll data) – including regional support, and potential 
sources of financial support (though this is highly speculative due to the opaque nature of party funding in 
Ukraine, and draws on media sources, expert opinion and Matuszak 2012). Figures for party membership 
were not publically available, except for two parties. However, in general due to political corruption in the 
post-Soviet space, the value of party membership figures is very limited.  
 
Table 2: Leading competitors in the 2014 parliamentary elections 
Party  Leader/Key figures 2012 election 
performance 
Current % 
rating (all 
respondents) 
Current % 
rating (those 
intending to 
vote) 
Bloc of Petro 
Poroshenko 
Vitaliy Klitchko, 
Yuriy Lutsenko 
UDAR obtained 14.0 26.8 45.7 
Radical Party Oleh Liashko Liashko was elected 
wih BYuT 2006 & 
2007 
8.1 13.7 
Civic Position Anatoliy Hrytsenko Hrytsenko was 
elected with Our 
Ukraine (2007) & 
Batkivshchina  (2012) 
4.8 8.1 
Batkivshchina 
(Fatherland) 
Yulia Tymoshenko 25.6 (when 
Tymoshenko was in 
prison the party was 
led by Arseniy 
Yatseniuk) 
4.7 8.1 
Popular Front 
[announced its 
formation only in 
August] 
Arseniy Yatseniuk, 
OleksandrTurchynov 
Arsen Avakov 
(key figures led 
Fatherland in 2012) 
3.3 5.6 
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Strong Ukraine  Serhiy Tihipko (merged with PRU 
2012 until 2014) 
2.8 4.4 
Svoboda (Freedom) Oleh Tiahnybok 9.7 2.6 4.5 
Communist Party of 
Ukraine (CPU) 
Petro Symonenko, 
Adam Martyniuk 
13.2 2.0 2.9 
Party of Regions 
(PRU)* 
Borys Kolesnikov, 
Nestor Shufrych 
30.0 1.3 1.9 
Association “Self-
Help” (Samopomich) 
Andriy Sadovyi, 
Hanna Hopko 
- 1.2 2.0 
Opposition Bloc Yuriy Boyko, Yuriy 
Miroshnychenko, 
Natalya Korolevska 
(includes ex-PRU 
deputies) 
  
Not intending to vote   15.5  
*not participating in 2014 elections 
Poll data shows only parties polling over 1%. Sourced from SOCIS poll conducted 5-10.9.14, 
http://www.socis.kiev.ua/ua/press/rezultaty-sotsiolohichnoho-doslidzhennja-ukrajina-na-starti-
vyborchoji-kampaniji-2014.html (accessed 23.9.14). 
 
 Bloc of Poroshenko – this electoral bloc brings together Vitaliy Klitchko’s UDAR party of former 
politicians and business people associated with ex-President Yushchenko and Our Ukraine, well-
known civic activists, journalists and military figures as well as several figures connected with the 
previous regime (moderates from the Party of Regions, gas lobby and former corrupt Kyiv Mayor 
Leonid Chernovetskyi). According to KIIS polls, the bloc will draw its electorate predominantly from 
the centre and west of the country, and it intends to cooperate with Yatseniuk’s People’s Front 
and Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchina in single mandate constituency contests (Koshkina 2014). In the 
May 2014 presidential elections, Poroshenko won support throughout Ukraine. UDAR like Strong 
Ukraine attracts middle class business and professional voters in eastern and western Ukraine. 
 The Radical Party of Oleh Liashko – widely seen as a spoiler party funded by Serhiy Lyovochkhin 
(the ‘gas lobby’) to take votes from Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchina in 2012 and Tymoshenko in May 
2014, it has become a populist anti-establishment party likely to win seats and form its own faction 
in the new parliament. The party is strongly based on Liashko’s maverick charismatic personality 
and forthright, hectoring style. He achieved much publicity for vigilante operations in the conflict 
zone. The party list includes neo-Nazi politician Ihor Moisychuk, other volunteer battalion 
commanders, Euromaidan activists as well as singers and sportspeople. His electoral support basis 
is in Kyiv, west and central Ukraine and the party is likely to take protest votes given to 
Batkivshchina and Svoboda in 2012. 
 Civic Position – together with the little known Democratic Alliance Party. Bloc leader Anatoly 
Hrytsenko is a respected ex-defence minister of national-democratic orientation, who was 
previously allied with Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine (2007-10) and Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchina 
(2010-2014). The party is the only one polling an even level of support across Ukraine’s regions. 
Hrytsenko was one of the first to reveal his party donors from medium-level businessmen. 
 Batkivshchina (Fatherland) – since its inception for the 2002 elections Batkivshchina was 
subsumed into the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT), which was a rather heterogeneous alliance 
of variously national democratic, nationalist, social and liberal democratic forces, backed 
financially by minor oligarchs and the Industrial Union of Donbas led by Serhiy Taruta, now 
governor of Donetsk. During Yanukovych’s presidency, Tymoshenko’s imprisonment helped the 
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party convincingly brand itself as the united opposition force, led by Arseniy Yatseniuk. The party 
lost many of its oligarchic funders during this period as they were put under pressure to not 
support the opposition on pain of losing their businesses (Matsuszak 2012, p.40). The party split 
at the end of August 2014 over election tactics, losing PM Yatseniuk along with deputy leader, 
parliamentary speaker and long-term Tymoshenko ally Oleksandr Turchynov and several other 
prominent politicians, who are standing in a new bloc, Popular Front. The party list contains 
prominent military figures and Euromaidan activists as well as sitting MPs. Previous election 
performance and recent polls demonstrate the party’s electoral base is in western and central 
Ukraine.  
 Popular Front (Narodnyi Front) - former Fatherland politicians who announced their intension to 
join a parliamentary coalition with the Bloc of Poroshenko, and briefly they negotiated forming a 
single party list before deciding to stand separately. The party sought to underscore the tougher 
political stance of PM Yatseniuk with regard to the war in Donbas by forming a military council at 
its founding conference. However domestic and international pressure persuaded the party not to 
include two far right candidates from the Social National Party leading the volunteer Azov battalion 
onto the party list.  
 Strong Ukraine – this party, formed as Labour Ukraine in 1998 as the political home of a wing of 
the Dnipropetrovsk clan and then renamed, was the vehicle of Serhiy Tihypko that merged with 
the Party of Regions in 2012 and ‘seceded’ in 2014. Prior to that the party entered parliament as 
part of the Bloc of Volodymyr Lytvyn in 2007. The party list contains oligarch Tariel Vasadze, 
(formerly of BYuT and the Party of Regions) and former Security Service Chairman Valery 
Khoroshkovskyi who split with the Party of Regions in late 2012 and went into ‘exile’ abroad. The 
party’s electoral support base is among middle class voters in the east and south.  
 Svoboda (Freedom) – this populist nationalist far right party lost much popular support during the 
Euromaidan revolution as they transpired to be less radical in deeds than in words, but also 
because they benefitted considerably from protest votes against Yanukovych in 2012. Svoboda 
have been in power in three Galicia regions since 2010 and public disappointment in their 
performance is palpable. Some figures put their membership at 15,000 (Olszański, 2011). Their 
electoral support is concentrated in western and central Ukraine.   
 Communist Party of Ukraine – the CPU is an unreconstructed successor party to the Soviet era 
party and was the best institutionalised party in terms of organisation, ideology and membership 
during the 1990s, but its electoral support was eroded by competition with the much better 
resourced Party of Regions in its electoral heartland of the East and South. The party membership 
is estimated at 115,000 which makes it one of the largest in Ukraine. The party was in 
parliamentary coalitions with the oligarchic Party of Regions (in 2006-2007 and 2010-2014) and as 
such is seen as part of the ancient regime. It was funded by including a number of entrepreneurs 
into its party list. 
 Party of Regions (PRU) – in early September the PRU decided not to compete in the face of poor 
poll ratings and the loss of much of its core electorate in annexed Crimea and partly occupied 
Donbas. Instead a number of its MPs will seeks election as independents in single mandate 
constituencies or on other party lists. 
 Opposition Bloc is widely regarded as a project of ’gas lobbyist’ Lyovochkhin and the party list is 
headed by former Party of Regions deputy Yuriy Miroshnychenko and Minister of Energy Boyko 
and contains other ex-Party of Regions MPs. The bloc position is for Ukraine’s neutrality and 
preserving non-aligned status. Poll data for this bloc is not yet available, but its positioning suggests 
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it is aiming for votes from the east and south. It was formed in September 2014 as a coalition of 
six small, extra-parliamentary parties, the most well-known of which is Natalya Korolevska’s 
Forward Ukraine!, a party that as the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine was a member of BYuT in 
the 2002, 2006 and 2007 elections. The party was subsequently the subject of a hostile takeover 
by Yanukovych and Akhmetov, its leadership changed and it was renamed. In 2012 this party 
received enormous funding from Akhmetov for a prominent campaign that was positioned to take 
votes from Batkivshchina. It obtained 1.6% vote and in 2012, Korolevska joined the government. 
 
Note: People’s Strength (Syla Liudey) is a genuine grassroots party that emerged from Euromaidan and 
is funded by membership dues and crowd-sourcing, which sought to articulate a clearly orientated 
programme and be based on internal party democracy. The party’s candidates were professionals and 
activists and did not contain high profile, charismatic figures. One well-known candidate was 
constitutional lawyer, Viktor Musiaka. Although the party will struggle to compete with the better-
known and better-funded parties and is unlikely to enter the parliament, this is one of several new 
formations that models a genuine commitment to transparency and democracy new to Ukrainian party 
politics.   
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